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This  article  analyzes  the  effects  of  public  financing  of  electoral  campaigns  on  policies  announced  by 
ideologically  oriented  parties,  subject  to  pre-electoral  lobbying.  Parties’  ideologies  make  politicians 
announce divergent platforms, even though it means losing some votes. Divergent platforms, in turn, make 
lobbies actually contribute to parties’ electoral campaigns. The announced platforms are biased in favor of 
the parties’ ideology and interest groups’ preferred policies. Finally, increasing public financing of electoral 
campaigns may generate unequal electoral competition and may significantly raise the chances of one party 
becoming hegemonic, wiping out party competition in the long run. 
Key words:  Public campaign financing, private political contributions, party ideology, electoral competition.   




Democracy has made impressive progress over the last 30 years in Latin America. Since the begining of 
the “third wave” of democratization in 1978, the Index of Electoral Democracy has raised from below 0.3 
in 1977 to above 0.9 in 2002 (UNDP, 2004), confirming that most citizens in the region live in highly 
electoral democratic countries. However, that positive situation has been constantly upset by political 
challenges.  Over the 13-year period 1990-2002 there have been 12 cases of elections in which significant 
irregularities were detected (UNDP, 2004) in Latin America. Moreover, cases of illicit political funding 
through hidden accounts or covert line items have ignited several crises and placed many a president and 
former president in situations of impeachment or even prison, including Brazil’s Fernando Collor de 
Mello,  Ecuador’s  Jamil  Mahuad,  Guatemala’s  Alfonso  Portillo,  Nicaragua’s  Arnoldo  Alemán  and 
Venezuela’s Carlos Andrés Pérez (Griner & Zovatto, 2005).  
  The concern about political corruption in Latin America has called attention to electoral campaign 
finances.  There  is  presently  a  renewed  debate  on  what  should  be  the  appropriate  form  of  campaign 
financing regulation both at the academic and at the policy front (Poiré, 2005). At the policy front, a 
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symptomatic data appears in Transparency International’s 2004 Global Corruption Report (Transparency 
International, 2004), which is dedicated to political corruption.  The report’s country studies analyse 
seven Latin American countries during the period spanning from July 2002 to June 2003 (Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Nicaragua and Peru). Four of the studied countries modified their 
political  campaign  financing  law  (Argentina,  Brazil,  Chile  and  Peru)  in  that  short  period  of  time. 
Moreover, one of the countries that did not make legislative modifications  (Costa Rica) witnessed a clear 
call for such reform
1 and, as a consequence, the Constitutional Court ruled that “the movements and 
balances of current accounts held by political parties in state or private commercial banks or in any other 
non-banking financial entity can, in principle, be accessed by anybody”. Therefore, five out of the seven 
countries studied in the report made significant changes to the electoral campaign financing procedures. 
  Although Latin America strikes out as a region of constant campaign legislation reforms, more 
traditional  democracies  also  display  their  shares  of  procedural  changes.  Public  financing  of  electoral 
campaigns was implemented in the United Stated in 1904 and several additional rules were established 
since then, mainly motivated by fundraising scandals (Watergate investigations) or by the increasing cost 
of electoral campaigns. A new change occurred in 2003 with the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, which 
prohibits  transfers  from  parties  to  candidates  (soft  money)  if  the  money  was  obtained  from  illegal 
sources
2. 
Germany initiated public electoral financing of in 1959, but it was in 1992 reformed due to a 
concern that public financing might reduce incentives for financial support from party  members and 
sympathetic citizens
3. In that country there was originally a “Parties Financing Act” that set government 
disbursement levels for parties based on numbers of votes received, but, since a new revision to the Party 
Law in 1994, public financing is based on party membership and private contributions as well as the 
number  of  votes  received
4.  Moreover,  anonymous  private  donations  must  not  exceed  US$  500  and 
detailed information must be provided for donors of more than US $ 10,000
5. 
  On  June  11,  2003  Canada’s  House  of  Commons  passed  a  bill  limiting  corporate  and  union 
donations to political parties to a maximum of US$ 1,000 and allowing them only at the riding association 
level, not directly to federal parties. Even the individual donation was limited to a maximum of US$ 
5,000 per person. A new system of public funding has been established to compensate for the funding 
                                                 
1 According to Transparency International, 2004, “Investigations into the source of financing for the two main political parties, 
the  National  Liberation  Party  (PLN)  and  Social  Christian  Unity  Party  (PUSC),  during  the  2002  presidential  election 
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need to tighten political finance legislation”.   
2 See “A Framework for Political Party Financing”, by Felix Ulloa at www.aceproject.org/main/english/ei/eix_a040.htm, and 
at www.cbc.ca/news/features/ campaign_contributions030128.html. 
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Salvador, at www.aceproject.org/main/english/ei/eix_a040.htm. 
4 See www.germany-info.org/relaunch/info/publications/infocus/Elections/Political_parties.html. 
5 See www.cbc.ca/news/features/campaign_contributions030128.html.   3
shortfall, which is based on the number of votes received by a party in the previous election, in the form 
of US$ 1,75 per taxpayer subsidy
6. 
Focusing back on Latin America, Brazil’s recent history presents a clear example of constant 
electoral reform. In 1971, Law 5682 imposed a total ban on direct private political donations to parties at 
the time it created a public fund for supporting electoral campaigns. Eighty percent (80%) of the total 
amount  of  the  fund  resources  were  distributed  among  existing  parties  according  their  proportional 
representation  in  Congress,  whereas  the  remaining  20%  were  equally  shared  among  all  parties
7.  On 
December 29, 1992 Congress impeached Brazilian President Fernando Collor de Mello after a several-
months trial characterized by strict respect to the established institutions and popular pressure. One of the 
main arguments for the impeachment was that the president was unable to explain campaign donations he 
illegally received
8. The Collor scandal highlighted the fact that it is basically impossible to ban private 
political  donation.  Therefore,  a  new  campaign  financing  legislation  was  passed  in  1995,  Law  9096, 
allowing private financing. Furthermore, the legislation established new norms for the working of the 
public fund, the Parties’ Fund (Fundo Partidário). According to the new rules, the Treasury transfers 
every  year  to  the  Fund  an  amount  equivalent  to  the  number  of  registered  voters  by  the  month  of 
December of the previous year, multiplied by R$ 0.35 (35 cents of a Real, the Brazilian currency). Ninety 
nine percent (99%) of the Fund’s resources are distributed among parties according to their Congressional 
representation, whereas the remaining 1% is equally shared among all parties. Although private financing 
became  legal  after  the  1995  law,  the  huge  discrepancy  between  the  candidates’  declared  donations 
suggests  that  there  might  still  be  an  important  market  for  illegal  contributions
9,10.  Presently,  several 
projects for a new electoral law are being voted in the Brazilian Congress. A project passed in the Senate 
on April 26, 2001 eliminates private donations and increases the amount of per-voter-equivalent Treasury 
                                                 
6 See www.cbc.ca/news/features/campaign_contributions030128.html. 
7 The distribution of public resources according to the parties’ proportions in the Legislatures seems to be the most usual way 
of distributing public resources to finance campaigns , taking place in countries such as Belgium, France, Italy and Spain.  
8 According to a parliamentary inquiry committee (Comissão Parlamentar de Inquérito), there were over US$350 million of 
unexplained funds. See “O Esquema PC”, Section “Fique de Olho”, Veja On Line, http:/www.veja.com.br, Editora Abril, 
2000. 
9  To  Samuels  (2001),  the  electoral  system  in  Brazil  is  such  that  the  resources  are  obtained  individually,  that  is  to  say, 
candidates, not parties, are responsible for obtaining the resources for their campaigns. This feature creates distortions in their 
declared expenses, and turns elections in Brazil relatively more expensive than in the United States, for example.  
10 For example, in the election of 1998, the winning governor of the State of Paraíba, José Maranhão, declared having spent a 
campaign budget of US$110,400 whereas the winning governor of the nearby (and smaller) State of Sergipe, Albano Franco, 
declared his campaign budget to be of US$1.1 million. Also the runner-up candidate for presidency, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, 
declared a budget of US$3.4 million, whereas the winner, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, declared more than 11 times that 
amount: US$37 million. (See “O Caixa Dois de Volta à Luz”, Edition nº 1.676, Veja magazine, 11/20/2000; the amounts in 
reals were converted to dollars based the exchange rate of July, 1998).   4
transfer  from  the  current  R$  0.35  to  the much higher  R$  7.00
11.  However,  the  proportional  rule  for 
distribution of public funds among parties remains unchanged
12.  
The previous examples suggest that the effect of different types of electoral financing have not yet 
been clearly sorted out in the applied policy debate. The theoretic literature’s seminal article is Baron 
(1994) that models an electoral competition in which candidates may favor interest groups in order to 
receive  contributions  to  their  campaigns  and,  consequently,  influence  uninformed  voters.  The  article 
introduces  public  financing  by  means  of  an  equal  lump  sum  amount  given  to  each  candidate.  This 
financing leads first to a reduction of an original policy bias in favor of interest groups, and second to a 
more egalitarian electoral competition. However, one may argue that Baron (1994)’s mechanism is highly 
unlikely to exist in practice, as it suggests that the same amount of public money should be given to large 
and small parties, regardless the size. In fact, according to Zovatto (2003)’s 18 Latin-American country 
study, all 15 nations that adopted direct public financing of electoral campaigns have at least part of the 
resources based on party size in the previous elections
13. Therefore, the present paper’s models assume 
this type of public financing proportional to party-representation. 
  In a more recent article, Roemer (2006) analyzes two different institutions of public financing in a 
model where each lobbyist group contributes only to a specific party. In one of the public financing 
institutions, each informed voter receives a voucher worth k dollars to be donated to the party of her 
choice, and in the other, public funds match the private contributions. The study finds that parties would 
propose policies closer to the ideal point of the informed voters in the former public financing system, 
and that the distortion caused by private financing would be magnified in the latter matching system. 
Thus, public financing would succeed in reducing policy distortion when it is based on a system that 
resembles the party’s representation criterion discussed. 
  The present paper attempts to analyze parties’ electoral financing mechanism in a more general 
framework. Our model allows for public funds (collected from the entire population by means of taxation 
and distributed to the parties according to the party-representation proportional rule discussed above) and 
private contributions from interest groups, and for parties being both office and policy motivated. The 
main objective is to assess how policy decisions (and consequently voters’ welfare) are affected by public 
and/or  private  contributions  when  parties  have  differing  ideologies  and  to  what  extent  the  type  of 
financing  affects  parties’  representation  in  Congress  in  the  short  and  long  run,  as  a  proxy  to  party 
competition inequality. 
                                                 
11 Brazilian Senate Projects 151/99 and 353/99, passed on  04/26/2001 (Project 4593/01 in the House of Representatives). 
12 Recently, a special commission was designated in the House of Representatives to study this and other issues, but the 
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in the House of Representatives. 
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The electoral competition model focuses on elections for the Legislature, using as its main tool the 
probabilistic voting approach introduced in Lindbeck and Weibull (1987). The hypothesis that campaign 
spending can influence voters follows Baron (1994), and the idea of obtaining endogenously lobbyists’ 
private contributions is borrowed from Grossman and Helpman (1996) and Persson and Tabellini (2000, 
chapter 3). 
  Our  model  shows  that,  in  equilibrium,  parties  tend  to  announce  divergent  platforms.  This 
divergence reflects parties’ rigid ideology, leading to policies that differ from the socially optimal one. 
Moreover, parties’ announced policies are biased in favor of lobby’s interests due to the competition for 
private contributions. If it is possible to enforce a ban on private contributions, then the bias in favor of 
interest groups disappears. However, the bias due to parties’ ideology still remains, so that a campaign 
that is completely financed by public funds will not promote social welfare. 
  In  terms  of  party  competition,  the  fact  that  policies  diverge  ensures  that  interest  groups  will 
effectively contribute to electoral campaigns, with a real effect on the parties’ probability of success. 
However,  a  party’s  strong  ideological  rigidity  may  reduce  its  received  contributions,  because  strong 
ideology decreases the bias in favor of interest groups. This effect may be so strong that some interest 
groups may prefer to contribute to a party whose preferred platform is more distant from the group’s 
preferred one, but that is less rigid in contraposition
14. The private contributions, in turn, can directly 
affect the chances of success of a party, switching the balance in favor of a party that originally represents 
only a small part of society. This is the static effect of lobbying on parties’ chances of success. 
  Although the existence of private contributions affects parties’ platforms announcement decisions, 
since public financing is predetermined and does not change with parties’ political positions, it does not 
have any effect on parties’ platform announcements. Its direct effect in the short run reduces to changing 
parties’ probability of obtaining the majority of seats in the Legislature. However, in the long run, the 
mechanism of public financing according to the parties’ relative size in the Legislature may provide an 
extreme advantage to a party, leading to a predominance of that party in the long run. Furthermore, such 
an  advantage  may  arise  even  in  a  situation  where  that  party  is  extremely  ideologically  oriented  and 
therefore may not be very attractive to the majority of the population to start with.  
  Our model results confirm the ones in Baron (1994) and Roemer (2006) about policy convergence 
to a socially superior policy if there are no private contributions and the parties’ ideologies are not very 
rigid. However, the results related to the private contributions and to the probability of a party getting a 
increasing number of votes completely differ from the ones reached by those studies. In fact, in our 
model, lobbies may even contribute to a party that they do not initially identify with, if it has a very 
flexible ideology, which affects party competition in the short run.  
                                                 
14  This captures the idea of lobbying without restricting that a group can only contribute to a specific party (contrary to 
Roemer, 2006) and shows the flexibility of our model.   6
  Moreover,  under  some  circumstances,  public  financing  will  completely  determine  a  dominant 
party in the long run, in spite of society or interest lobbyists. One important caveat is that the effect of 
public  financing  depends  strongly  on  its  amount.  Indeed,  if  public  financing  is  too  small,  it  has  an 
insignificant long run effect. On the other hand, if it is high enough, it may entirely jeopardize party 
competition in the long run. Therefore, the present study contributes to the discussion about the optimal 
regulation  of  campaign  financing  by  showing  that  there  may  not  be  a  fast,  clear-cut  answer  to  that 
question, and that issues regarding the amount of the public financing may be in fact very important to the 
resulting political equilibrium. It also highlights the potential negative effects of distributing public funds 
according to the size of each party in the Legislature, which suggests that a more balanced distribution 
may be welfare enhancing.  
  The rest of the paper is divided as follows. Section 2 presents and solves the model in which 
parties are office and policy-motivated and electoral campaigns can be financed by interest groups and by 
the government. Section 3 deals with long run parties’ representation in the Legislature in an infinitely 
iterated  version  of  the  electoral  competition  game.  Section  4  briefly  discusses  the  shortcomings  and 
possible extensions of the present study. Finally, Section 5 presents the main conclusions. 
 
2. A Model of Electoral Competition with Public and Private Electoral Financing and Office and 
Policy- Motivated Parties 
The electoral competition game between parties, lobbyists and voters is presented in Figure 1. The main 
modeling hypothesis here is that parties announce their policies first, and then lobbyists decide whether or 
not to make political contributions based on these announcements. Parties use the private contributions 
and the public funds they receive in order to influence voters during the electoral campaign. After the 
electoral  campaign,  each  voter  receives  stochastic  signals  that  affect  his  preferences  for  the  parties, 
observes the announced platform of each party and vote sincerely, i.e., for the party that best represents 
his preferences. There is one national electoral district in which each voter has one vote. After elections, 
each party is assigned a quantity of seats in the Legislature that corresponds to the percentage of received 
votes.  Once  the  new  Legislature  is  formed,  it  decides  which  policy  to  implement  according  to  the 
following rule: the party that has a majority of seats is able to implement its campaign platform
15. 
  The  basic  model  extends  Persson  and  Tabellini  (2000,  chapter  3),  in  order  to  allow  for  a 
discussion on three main points. First, we allow for public funding of electoral campaigns in addition to 
private contributions. Second, we allow for partial control of the executive over private contribution. 
Third, we allow for the parties to be policy motivated in addition to office motivated.  
                                                 
15  The model assumes that the Legislature is composed of an odd number of seats. Therefore, one party always has a majority 
of seats. 
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  Note that only the wider, curved rectangles correspond to real strategic decision in Figure 1. The 
top  one  corresponds  to  parties’  platform  announcement;  the  second  one  from  the  top  to  lobbyists’ 
campaign  contributions decisions; and the second one  from the bottom to voters’ choices. The third 
(squared) box from the top states the assumption that parties use all available resources in their electoral 
campaign, so that there is no decision about deviation of resources out of the campaign in the present 
model. The ellipsis represents the realization of random variable that are out of the control of the players 
and the last (squared) box states the typical assumption of full commitment made in models of electoral 
competition, i.e., the majority party implements its announced policy. 
Parties simultaneously announce their political platforms 
Lobbyists simultaneously choose their campaign contributions 
Parties use received public funds and private 
to influence voters 
Stochastic factors that affect 
voters’ preferences for parties 
are realized 
Citizens vote 
The Legislature is formed according to the 
proportion of votes of each party 
The party with a majority of seats implements 
its announced policy 
Figure 1: The Electoral Competition Game 
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  In  what  follows  we  detail  the  main  elements  of  the  electoral  competition  model  and, 
simultaneously, solve the game by backwards induction.  
 
2.1. Voters’ electoral decision 
  There is a continuum of unit mass of voters, W=[0,1]. Each voter belongs to one of three social 
classes according to his income. The upper class R (“rich”) is composed of voters with high-income y
R; 
the middle class M is formed by voters of average income y
M; finally, the lower class P (“poor”) encloses 
voters  with  low  income  y
P.  Thus,  y
R  >  y
M  >  y
P.  A  social  class  J,  J=R,  M,  P,  has  mass  a
J,  so 




  There are two parties P=A, B, which compete by announcing the level of production of a per 
capita public good g that will be implemented if the party obtains the majority of seats in the Legislature. 
Public good provision is financed by an income tax given by the rate t, which is the same for all voters. 
All tax-collected resources are converted into the public good and public funding for parties’ campaigns. 
Let c be the government’s per capita cost of public funding of electoral campaigns. Then the government 
budget  constraint  is  c g y y J
J J + = ∑ =t t a ,  where  ∑ =
J
J J y y a represents  the  average  income  of 
voters. 
  A  voter’s  utility  has  two  components:  a  pragmatic  (or  sociotropic)  and  an  ideological  (or 
idiosyncratic) one
17. The pragmatic part of the utility represents the voter’s decisions as an economic 
agent, and depends on the consumption of a private good, as well as the consumption of the public good 
provided by the government. Suppose platform g wins the election. Then, an agent of class J’s income net 
of  taxes,  ( )
y
y
c g y y c
J
J J - - = - = ) 1 ( t ,  which  is  normalized  to  be  the  agent’s  private  consumption 
utility. Therefore, the pragmatic part of the utility of a voter of class J is shown below, where the utility of 
public good consumption is given by the function H, which is assumed to be strictly increasing and 
strictly concave.  
) ( ) ( ) ( g H
y
y
c g y g W
J
J + - - =   (1) 
  Thus, each class has its own optimal policy for the public good provision. These optimal policies 
are obtained by maximizing each class’ utility function and are given by: 
                                                 
16 The three-class model is a simple way to characterize differences in wealth among citizens. However, it is straight forward 
to extend it to any finite number of classes. 
17  This is the most general way of characterizing an economic agent who also has political concerns. For more on this topic, 














1 * ) ' ( , J=P, M, R. 
  The ideological component of a voter’s utility function is represented by two random variables 
corresponding  to  the  voter’s  bias  towards  party  B,  or  equivalently,  party  B’s  popularity  at  the  time 
elections are held. The first random variable is common to all voters and is associated to the realization of 
a state of nature that affects the entire population. A war, an abrupt change in international prices of a 
commodity  that  is  important  to  the  country  and  a  country-wide  energy  crisis  are  examples  of  such 
phenomenon.  A  clear  example  is  the  popularity  of  the  U.S.  president  after  the  terrorist  attack  on 
September 11
th, 2001, which increased from 57% in February to 90% in September
18. That process is 
described by a random variable d
~













parameter y>0 measures the level of sensibility of society to aggregate shocks: the lower the value of y , 
the more those shocks may affect society. 
  The second random variable is particular to each voter i in group J and reflects his personal bias 
towards  party  B.  This  bias  is  modeled  as  a  random  variable 












. Hence, the greater the parameter f
J , the more homogeneous is class J . For simplicity, 
and  in  order  to  avoid  electoral  effects  of  class  heterogeneity,  we  normalize  all  the  classes’  random 
variable parameters to f=f
J, J=P, M, R. 
  Therefore, if party B wins a majority of seats in the Legislature with the announced platform gB, a 
voter i in the social class J derives utility  d s
~
) ( + +
iJ
B
J g W . 
  Note that positive values for s
iJ and for  d
~
 indicate a favorable bias towards party B, whereas 
negative values indicate a favorable bias towards party A. Also note that the realization of the global 
random variable can be favorable to party B and at the same time, the realization of the individual-
specific random variable can favor party A, and vice-versa.
19 
  Consider now the role of campaign contributions in the model. For simplicity we assume that 
overall campaign spending will affect the ideological component of his utility function, in a way that is 
linear to the difference between the total parties’ expenditure. Then, the utility of a voter i of class J when 
party  B’s  (respectively,  party  A’s)  campaign  spending  is  CB  (respectively,  CA)  and  party  B  wins  the 
majority of the Legislature seats is: 
                                                 
18  See “Poll Analyses”, Section “Gallup Poll News Service”, The Gallup Organization, http:/www.gallup.com, 09/24/2001. 
19  Suppose, for example, that the country faces an economic expansion, so that society approves the incumbent for overall 
conduct of the economy, but the president is involved in a sexual scandal, which can affect voters differently. 
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( ) A B
iJ
B
J C C h g W - + + + d s
~
) (   (2) 
  The  parameter  h>0  represents  the  effectiveness  of  campaign  spending,  i.e.,  how  much  the 
difference between party campaign expenditures can affect its popularity. Note that if CB is greater than 
CA,  then  party  B  gains  popularity  during  the  electoral  campaign.  Otherwise,  overall  campaign 
expenditures reduce B’s popularity. 
  Suppose now that party P announces policy gP, P = A, B. Then a voter i in group J will prefer 





J C C h g W g W - + + + > d s
~
) ( ) ( . 
  This comparison determines voters’ electoral decision. 
 
2.2. A benchmark for welfare comparison 
  Suppose  party  P  with  the  election  with  policy  gP.  Then  an  agent  I  of  class  J  derives  utility 
( ) ( ) A B
iJ
P P
J C C h g W - + + + d s q
~
) ( , where qP is the party index function, qP=1 if P=B and 0 otherwise. 
Suppose, moreover, that voters cannot be influenced by the electoral campaign expenditure, i.e., h=0. 
Then,  the  expected  utility  of  that  voter  (before  the  random  variables  are  realized)  reduces  to 






c g y g W + - - = .  We  want  to  determine  what  policy  maximizes  aggregate  welfare 




P g W g W a , 
which yields the socially optimal policy  ( ) 1 ) ' (
1 * - = = H g gP . This will be our benchmark for welfare 
comparison in what follows. 
  
2.3. Lobbyists contributions’ decision 
  From voters’ electoral decision, one can identify for each class J a voter that is indifferent between 
the two parties, who is called the swing voter of class J. That voter corresponds to the realization of s
iJ, 
defined as 
J s  by: 
d s
~
) ( ) ( ) ( - - + - = B A B
J
A
J J C C h g W g W   (3) 
  Therefore, the number of votes cast for party A is: 

















  (4) 








B g W g W ) ( ) ( a , the probability of party A 
getting the majority of seats is  )] ( ) ( ) (
~
[ ] 2 / 1 [ B A B A
A
A C C h g W g W prob prob p - + - < = > = d p  
  Equivalently:   11
)] ( ) ( ) ( [
2
1
B A B A A C C h g W g W p - + - + = y   (5) 
  Now, by symmetry: 
A B A B A B p C C h g W g W p - = - + - - = 1 )] ( ) ( ) ( [
2
1
y   (6) 
  Let us now determine the total amount of campaign resources available to the parties, CA and CB. 
  Given the proportional public-financing distribution rule widely used in Latin America (Zovatto, 
2003) discussed in the introduction, we assume that the total amount of resources directed to a party P (P 
= A, B) is proportional to P’s representation in Congress during the previous Legislature. Let bP be the 
percentage of the total legislative seats held by party P, P = A, B. Then, bA+bB=1 and the per capita funds 
received by each party from the government is bP.c , where c is the per capita cost for the government of 
the public funding of electoral campaigns. 
  As for private financing, the main distinction among classes is that only organized classes who 
have solved the collective action problem (Olson, 1971) are able to make private contributions. Let the 
parameter O
J represent weather class J is organized, i.e., O
J=1 if class J is organized and 0 otherwise.  
Thus, if each class J makes the private contribution 
J
P
JC O  to party P = A, B, the total amount of private 




J J C O a . 
  In order to allow  for the possibility that the law bans private  contributions, we introduce the 
parameter  ] 1 , 0 ( Î l   that  measures  how  efficient  the  electoral  authorities  are  in  exposing  illegal 
contributions
20. If private contributions are allowed, then l=1; otherwise, the unlawful contributions may 
be unvailed and confiscated by the electoral authorities with probability  l - 1 . The hypothesis that l>0 
implies that it is never possible to completely block illegal contributions.  
  Therefore, the total amount of contributions party P receives is: 





P P , , = + = ∑ a l b    
  In order to determine group J’s private contributions to a party P, 
J
P C , let us analyze the interest 
groups’  problem.  An  organized  class’  utility  depends  on  the  implemented  policy,  as  well  as  on  the 












A C C g W p g W p + - - +   (7) 
  The first two terms in the above equation reflect the expected economic utility of a member of 
class J, whereas the last term reflects the utility cost of campaign contributions. The quadratic form of the 
                                                 
20  The authors are indebted to Marco Bonomo for highlighting this issue.   12
cost function models the fact that contributions typically involve not only a monetary transfer, but also 
personal involvement of organized voters. Note that the ideological components of voters’ utilities do not 
appear  in  the  above  equation  because  the  stochastic  components 
iJ s and  d
~
  are  realized  after  the 
contribution decisions are taken and have zero expected value. 
  Therefore, organized class J’s maximization problem is presented below, where pA is given by 
equation (5). 
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  Note that, if the utility an interest group obtains from platforms gA and gB are the same, then the 




A C C . However, if one platform gives more utility than the 
other, the group contributes only to the party that announces the better platform, i.e., 
J
P C  will be equal to 
zero for party P if gP gives less utility to the group, where P = A,B. The solution to the interest groups’ 
problem is: 
)]} ( ) ( [ , 0 { max B
J
A
J J J J
A g W g W O h C - = a y l  
)]} ( ) ( [ , 0 { max A
J
B
J J J J
B g W g W O h C - = a y l  
(8) 
  The above expression elucidates the lobbyists’ contribution decisions. 
 
2.4. Parties’ platform announcement decision 
Parties anticipate the contributions they will receive from interest groups by sequential rationality. It 
follows from (8) that,  
)] ( ) ( [ B
J
A
J J J J
B
J
A g W g W O h C C - = - a y l   (9) 
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2 2 b b a y l - + - = - ∑   (10) 
  Plugging  in  equation  (10)  into  equation  (5),  one  obtains  party  A’s  probability  of  obtaining  a 
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  Parties care about winning a majority of votes. However, we assume that parties also care about 
which policy is implemented. That is, parties have ideological preferences, party A strictly preferring 
policy  A g , and party B, strictly preferring  B g . The main rationale here is that parties are committed to 
their founding principles, which establish their preferred political platforms. Thus, announcing a platform   13
that deviates from their optimal one involves a utility loss. This is modeled by introducing a cost of 
announcing a policy away from the party’s optimal one, according to the functional form below. 
( ) | | ) , ( , A A A B A A B A A g g K g g p p p U - - = g  
( ) | | ) , ( , B B B B A B B A B g g K g g p p p U - - = g  
  The first summand of a party’s utility represents its office-seeking motivation, the pragmatic or 
sociotropic part of their utility
21. The term K represents the return to the party of gaining a majority in the 
Legislature, so that the  term is the expected utility of being a majority party. The second summand 
represents the utility cost that a party bears by announcing a different policy from its established optimal 
policy,  the  ideological  or  idiosyncratic  part  of  their  utility.  There  are  two  parts  to  this  ideological 
component. First, the further away the proposed policy from the party’s ideal policy, the costlier for the 
party. That is the term  P P g g -  which represents the pure ideological bias. Second, the coefficient gP 
represents  how  strongly  this  deviation  affects  a  party’s  utility,  and  measures  the  party’s  ideological 
rigidity. 
  For simplicity, we normalize the return K to 1. Moreover, according to Fiorina’s studies (1988, 
1992, 1996), we assume that parties’ optimal platforms are more extreme than society’s, due to two 
reinforcing phenomena. First, there is a self selection problem, as founding a party is a very demanding 
activity and only those who have strong and extreme policy positions accept to bear the corresponding 
cost.  Second,  parties  are  old  and  society  has  evolved  over  time  towards  the  center  of  the  political 
spectrum,  whereas  parties  have  kept  their  original,  more  extreme  political  positions.  Therefore,  we 
assume that  B P M R A g g g g g < < < <
* * * , where 
*
J g  (J=R,M,P) represents the optimal policy of the classes
22.  
  As party A takes a “leftist” position (a small  A g ), it is expected that any deviation in the platform 
to increase pA will occur in such a way that gA will automatically increase. So, one expects that, in 
equilibrium,  A A A A g g g g - = - | | .   On the other hand, party B will deviate from its optimal policy (a 
large  B g )  in  such  a  way  that  gB  will  decrease.  Thus,  in  equilibrium,  one  expects  that 
B B B B g g g g - = - | | . We assume that deviation pattern in what follows and confirm it once political 
parties’ problems are solved. Hence, the parties’ utility functions can be written as: 
) ( ) , (
A A g g g g p U A B A A A - - = g  
) ( ) , ( B B B A B B g g g g p U
B - - = g  
(12) 
                                                 
21  See  Ferejohn  (1986)  for  a  discussion  on  the  pragmatic/sociotropic  part  of  the  utility  function  vis  a  vis  its 
ideological/idiosyncratic part. 
22 Note that this assumption is not essential for the model, but it makes the solution to the game much simpler and the analysis 
of the corresponding equilibria more precise.   14
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Figure 2 - Groups’ and Parties’ Optimal Platforms  
   
When all effects of the parties’ platform announcement are introduced in the expression of   ) , ( B A A g g p  
and  ) , ( B A B g g p , then sequential rationality reduces the original extensive form game to a normal form 
game between parties A and B where the utilities are given by (12). The resulting dominant strategies 
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  Since 
R J P y y y £ £ , for all J = R,M,P, with at least one strict inequality, it must be the case that: 
R
J
J J J J
J
J J J P
J
J J J y O h y O h y O h ∑ ∑ ∑ + < + < + ] ) ( 1 [ ] ) ( 1 [ ] ) ( 1 [
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   Therefore, the simplification made in (12) is justified, i.e.,  A A g g > ~
 and  B B g g < ~
.  
 
  Let us analyze expressions (13). First note that public funds c do not enter any of the expressions 
for the equilibrium announcements. Therefore, public funding of electoral campaigns has no effect on the 
parties’ announced policies. 
  Second, in the absence of lobby (O
J=0, J=P,M,R) and with no party ideology (gA=gB=0), then both 
party converge to the same socially optimal equilibrium announcement:  * ~ ~ g g g B A = = .  Therefore, all 
deviations from the optimal policy is due either to the existence of lobby or to party ideological rigidity, 
or yet to the combined effect of both factor. 
inf g *
R g  
*
M g  
*
P g   A g   sup g B g    15
  Third, in the presence of lobby but with no party ideology, then both parties still converge to the 
same announcements, but now  *
ˆ ~ ~ 1 g
y
y
H g g g
L







- .  Therefore, the very presence of lobbyist 
groups makes the parties announce a suboptimal policy. The expression of  y ˆ  shows clearly that the 
deviation  occurs  towards  the  preferred  policies  of  organized  groups,  although  there  is  no  private 
contribution in equilibrium, since both parties announce the same policy. This is the effect of O
J on  y ˆ . 
This lobby effect can only be circumvent if it is possible to totally ban private contributions, i.e., l=0, 
which does not seem to be feasible in Latin America nor in any other region of the world. 
  Fourth, in the presence of lobby and parties’ ideological rigidity (i.e., positive values of  A g  and 
B g ), then parties will differentiate themselves by announcing opposing policies with  B
L
A g g g ~ ~ < < .  In 
this  case,  there  will  be  no  convergence  of  announced  platforms,  and  therefore,  there  will  be  private 
contribution  in  equilibrium,  which  will  affect  the  probability  of  each  party  winning  a  majority  of 
legislative seats. 
  Therefore  one  may  decompose  parties’  decisions  into  two  movements.  First,  a  centripetal 
movement (CP) towards platform g
L. Next, a centrifugal movement (CF) away from g
L towards each 
parties’ respective ideological preference,  A g  and  B g  (Figure 3). Parties’ final announcements,  A g ~  and 
B g ~ , are the compositions of these two opposing movements. A balance between the search for interest 






CPP: party P’s centripetal movement, P = A,B 
CFP: party P’s centrifugal movement, P = A,B 
Figure 3 – Parties’ Centripetal and Centrifugal Movement  
 
  Note that the higher the ideological rigidity (i.e. the higher value of  P g ), the higher the centrifugal 
movement, that is, the higher the deviation from the platform g
L towards parties’ optimal platforms ( A g  

















  Given the income of each of the three classes, their respective optimal platforms,
*
R g , 
*
M g  and 
*
P g , are such that the higher the income of a class, the lower the optimal platform value for this class in 
A g ~
 
* g B g ~
  A g   B g  
*
CPA  CPB  CFB  CFA 
L g  16
the interval [0, y-c]. Considering that parties’ respective ideologies are extreme, moving towards the 
center at different rates, one may expect that the rich and poor classes will be better represented by parties 
A and B, respectively. If those classes are organized, this encourages them to contribute to the electoral 
campaign of the party that better represents them. 
  On  the  other  hand,  because  the  announced  platforms  are  both  away  from  the  utility  of  an 
organized middle income group, this group will generically be less likely to finance electoral campaigns. 
Figure 4 illustrates the situation in which the poor group ends up being more likely to contribute than the 
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Figure 4 – Utility difference between poor and middle groups 
 
  Therefore, our model suggests a polarization in society so that the groups that will spend the most 
in  electoral  campaigns  will  be  the  rich  and  the  poor  ones.  This  polarization  occurs  because  higher 
contributions  are  commensurate  with  the  larger  utility  difference
23.  So  that,  in  countries  with 
predominantly middle income voters, elections may be cheaper than in countries where the middle class 
is small; this is consistent with Samuels’ (2001) indication that elections in Brazil are relatively more 
expensive than in the United States, for example. 
 






































































C C  
  Note that if party A’s ideological rigidity is sufficiently high, then the right had side may become 
negative. This indicates, for example, that even if the rich organized group prefers a priori party A, its 
support to this party will decrease with that party’s rigidity. Thus, it is even possible that this group will 
support party B. As party A would have a lower centripetal movement due to its high ideological rigidity, 
party B, with relatively lower ideological rigidity, would provide more utility to the rich group. This 
                                                 
23  This result would occur even if there were more than two parties. This is because a third ideological party that would defend 
a more centrist platform would be financed by the middle income group if this group has a risk aversion high enough to 
compensate the cost of this financing when compared with the expected utility of this group with more extreme platforms 
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R g    17
effect may  be heightened if one considers a situation in which party  B has low ideological  rigidity, 
extending its centripetal movement and approaching the platform that would be optimal to the rich group 






Figure 5 – Comparison between parties’ ideological rigidities  
 
  Let us now analyze parties’ probabilities of winning a majority of votes (11) in equilibrium:   
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(14) 
   
  The summands inside the brackets in the above expressions summarize each one of the three 
factors that affect the probability of victory. The first summand,  ) ~ ( ) ~ ( B A g W g W - , reflects voters’ direct 
welfare concern: the closer the policy to the society’s optimal policy g
*, the higher the party’s probability 





J J J g W g W O h )] ~ ( ) ~ ( [ ) ( ) (
2 2 a l y ,  reflects  the  battle  for 
lobbyists contributions. Finally, the third summand,  ) ( B A hc b b - , reflects the effect of public funding.  
  Hence, although public funding of electoral campaigns does not affect the equilibrium announced 
policies, as we have seen previously, it does affect a party’s probability of victory, by giving additional 
advantage to a party that had a majority of seats in the previous Legislature. Note here the important role 
of the size of the per capita funds, c: if c is reduced, than the effect of public funding may be insignificant; 
however, if c is large, it may outset the other effects and transform a low probability of victory into a high 
one. This issue will be discussed in more detail when we consider an iterated version of the game in order 
to assess long run effects of public financing. 
 
3. The iterated electoral competition game 
Suppose now that the electoral competition game is repeated an infinite number of times. Then, the main 
dynamic connection between two successive electoral periods is the number of seats held by a party in 
one period, which defines the amount of public funding it will receive next period. In order to simplify 
the analysis, we limit the intertemporal strategic choices of parties by assuming that in each period a party 
takes only into consideration its utility in that period. This restriction allows us to disregards strategies in 
A g ~
  *
R g   B g ~
  A g   B g  
*  18
which a party would have a reduced utility today by strongly deviating from its preferred policy in order 
to obtain more votes and then, in the future, return to announcing policies closer to its preferred policy but 
then with higher public funds to run their electoral campaigns
24. This would be a reasonable assumption if 
politicians have low discount factors, i.e., if they highly value the present as compared to the future. 
  Under these assumptions, the iterated game starts at the end of period t=0, where party A holds 
0
A b  
percent of the seats of the Legislature (and consequently, party B holds 
0 0 1 A B b b - =  percent of the seats). 
Parties make their policy announcements, lobbyists make theirs campaign contributions, parties receive 
public and private funds and use them in order to influence voters, voters take their ballots based on the 
platform announcement, the influence of electoral campaigns and the realization of the stochastic shocks. 
Then, a new legislature is formed in period t=1 where the seats occupied by each party are proportional to 
the quantity of votes received. The party with a majority of voter implements its announced policy. At the 
end of period t=1 the game repeats itself, and so on for each period t >1. 
  The main dynamic component of this iterated game, the evolution of party representation in the 
Legislature can be analyzed using the following proposition that relates the probability of winning a 
majority of seat in the Legislature in one period with the expected representation in the Legislature next 
period. The corresponding proof can be found in the Appendix. 
Proposition:  In  a  proportional  electoral  unicameral  system,  the  expected  proportion  of  seats  party  A 
occupies in period t+1, 
1 + t
A b , relates to the probability of winning a majority of votes in period t according 
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1   (15) 
In order to simplify notation, we identify  ] [
t
A E b with 
t
A b . Also, since public funds do not affect the 
announce policy, it must be the case that  P
t
P g g ~ ~ = , the solution to the base game, for P=A, B, for all t.  
Plugging in the announced platforms as well as expressions (10) and (14) into (15), yields the equations 
below
25, in which  [ ] ) ~ ( ) ~ (
~
B A g W g W W
J J
J
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24 We are grateful to Ernesto Dal Bo for suggesting the use of the “iterated” term and to Ernesto Dal Bo and Ian Ayres for 
contributions to this discussion. 
25  This study postulates that the terms on the right side of expressions (24) and (25) are small enough to guarantee that 
1 , 0 £ £ t
B
t
A b b .   19




B b b - =1  
  The factors  W
~
 and W ˆ  compare, respectively, the weighted average utility of all social classes 
(welfare criterion) and to the weighted average utility of interest groups from the announced platforms 
A g ~  and  B g ~ , which, in turn, are related to lobby influence. The long run proportion of parties in the 
Legislature depends fundamentally on the size of the per capita public contributions, a shown below. 
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  The parties’ proportions in the Legislature can be rewritten as: 
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  In this case, where the per capita public contribution is small, it follows that: 
0 ) 2 ( lim =
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Hence, the parties’ expected representations in the long run converge to: 
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  Therefore, public contributions become less determinant of parties’ representation in the long run. 
Since  0 ) 2 1 ( > - c h f , factors  W
~
 and  W ˆ  will determine the legislative composition, which shows the 
combined effect of the direct quest for votes (W
~
) and the competition for private contribution (W ˆ ). 
  Thus, if society prefers a party and interest groups prefer the other, their effects are opposite, so 
that one cannot predict, a priori, which party is going to be the larger one in the long run. Note that one 
possible outcome is that a party with a strong ideology (and not preferred by the majority of social 
classes) will perpetuate itself in the long run because of the support of lobbyists. In this sense, party 
ideology may even become an advantage to a rigid party. This is so because, by receiving financial 
support from interest groups, an ideologically rigid party guarantees its existence by influencing voters 
during the electoral campaigns.   20
  In general, one expects that the second summand in above limiting expected representation to be 
small enough so that both parties are represented in the Legislature. In particular, given the stochastic 
shocks, one may expect a change of party as well as implemented policy over time.  
However, it is noteworthy that even though public funds have no decisive effect on the long run 
party equilibrium, the fact that  1 ) 2 1 ( < - c h f  shows that public funds increase the second summand in the 
long-run party representation expression, i.e., it reduces party competition in the sense that it amplifies the party 
that has a positive value for the term in brackets. 
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  In this case, the parties’ proportions in the long run become: 
[ ]
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B W h W t b l y f b + - + - =  
  The above expression shows that there will be a dominance of one party over the other in the long 
run.  The  balance  between  factors  W
~
  and  W ˆ   will  still  determine  which  party  will  dominate  the 
Legislature, i.e., the one for which the term in the brackets is positive. Note that in the very specific case 
where those effects are opposite and equal, the initial legislative composition will be maintained in the 
long  run  as 
0 lim A
t
A t b b =
¥ ®     and 
0 lim B
t
B t b b =
¥ ®   if    W h W ˆ ) (
~ 2 l y = .  However,  the  main  effect  of  public 
funding in this particular case is to foster the dominance of one party in the long-run. 
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  The parties’ proportions in the Legislature can be rewritten as: 
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A b b - =1  
  In this case where public contributions are significant, the last summand of the above expression 
increases indefinitely in absolute value. Therefore, in the long run one of the two parties will become 
hegemonic, as in the previous case. Which party will dominate depends on the sign of the term below, 
which reflects how attractive the announced policy is to voters (W
~
), how attractive it is to lobbyists (W ˆ ), 
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  Note  that  a  high  volume  of  public  contributions  may  bias  the  above  term  so  that  the  third 
summand dominates the sum of the first two ones. In this case, an initial, possibly minor advantage of 
party A in term of representation in the Legislature, i.e., 
0
A b  higher than 0.5 but very close to it, may 
transform that party into the hegemonic one in the long run. Therefore, although public financing has no 
effect on the announced policy, it may have the unexpected effect of perpetuating a party that obtains a 
majority  due,  for  example,  to  an  unlikely  realization  of  the  shock  variables,  such  as  a  war,  an 
unanticipated terrorist attack or a severe economic crisis.  
  This remark calls attention to possible opportunistic changes in the financial campaign legislation 
in order to favor a party that obtains a one-time majority in the Legislature. Indeed, a party that newly 
acquired a majority of seat in the Legislature may arbitrarily vote a significant increase in the value of per 
capita public finance c in order to ensure increasing (expected) representation
26.  
Therefore, a country must be extremely careful when changing its electoral campaign financing 
legislation, especially with respect to large increases in public funding. 
It is noteworthy that the potentially negative effect of public finance resides entirely in the fact 
that different sized parties receive different amounts of funds. Indeed, if both parties receive the same 
amount of contribution, then in the present model there is no effect of public funds on the probability of 
obtaining a majority of votes neither on the lung run party representation in the Legislature. Although, as 
we have discussed in the introduction, such egalitarian rule is not used in any of the 18 Latin American 
countries studied in Zovatto (2003), it may be important to address possible benefits of other rules for 
distribution of public funds. 
 
4. Limitations and Extensions 
  This paper’s study is part of a wider research about the incentives created by public and private 
campaign  financing  on  economic  and  political  agents  and  its  consequences  to  society.  The  model 
presented here makes a series of strong assumptions that need to be extended in order to assess its true 
theoretical and policy contribution. 
  One of its main weaknesses relates to the lobbyists’ motivations for contributing to parties. Here 
the only reason a lobbyist contributes is in order to increase the probability of victory of the party that 
announces  a  policy  that  better  represents  his  interests.  Although  this  is  clearly  part  of  a  lobbyist’s 
motivation, the empirical evidence in Latin America may suggest that lobbyists also profit from benefits 
the winning party directs to them (Transparency International, 2004). In that case, it may be profitable for 
                                                 
26 We are grateful for Ian Ayres for emphasizing this issue.   22
the lobbyist to contribute to several, rather than only one party, as some sort of electoral insurance. One 
possible way to analyze such incentives is to include more detailed micropolitical foundations into the 
utility of lobbyists, in order to assess his specific individual benefit from supporting a candidate
27. An 
alternative timing may also be considered, in order to model a possible negotiation between the lobbyist 
and the parties before the platform announcement, à la Grossman & Helpman (1996, 2001)
28.  
  There  may  also  be  some  important  information  revelation  role  to  the  electoral  campaign,  as 
several voters may have only imperfect information about important characteristics of the parties, such as 
the true quality of the politicians or the real policy to be implemented by the winning party, and the 
money spent during the electoral campaign may help voters obtain better information
29. In this case a 
certain amount of public financing will always be desirable, although it maybe desirable to limit it to a 
minimum  and  distribute  it  equally  among  parties
30.  More  generally,  we  would  like  to  analyze  the 
equilibrium effects of alternate forms of distribution of public funds. 
  Moreover, the iterated game is a weak approximation for the dynamic game, as it does not allow 
for rich enough dynamic strategies for the parties. If parties are willing to lose some utility by deviating 
from their optimal policy in one period but gain a majority of votes and then, in the next period, return to 
its preferred policy, then we may expect that the centripetal movement will dominate the centrifugal 
movement and we may observe a return to converging platform announcement
31. 
  An interesting extension relates to the possibly different effect of money spend on campaigns by 
different parties. Are there more “trustful” parties in the eyes of voters, so that they are more sensitive to 
these parties’ electoral campaigns? If so, cheaper campaigns may be as effective for these parties and the 
electoral equilibrium may be a very different one. What should the optimal distribution of public funds in 
this case? Moreover, we like to explore the results of the model when a more general form for including 
the cost of public contributions in the lobbyists’ utility function, as well as the effect of the electoral 
campaign on voters’ utility functions.  
  Finally, given Transparency International (2004)’s evidence on post-electoral direct benefits to 
lobbyists in Latin American, one could significantly enrich the model by including a post-electoral game. 
In that case, the opportunity of corruption should be contemplated. Therefore, voters should consider that 
possibility in their electoral decision, which, in turn, will lead to a voters’ concern for the controlling role 
of the opposition party in the Legislature. In such an extended model, the implemented policy would be 
the result of bargaining in the Legislature and voters may need to choose optimally the composition of the 
Legislature in order to minimize corruption opportunities, as suggested in Bugarin (1999) and (2003). 
                                                 
27 The authors are grateful to Ernesto Dal Bo for this insight. 
28 The authors are indebted to Francisco Ferreira for this suggestion. 
29 See Bennedsen and Feldmann (2002) for a careful discussion on informational lobbying. 
30 We gratefully acknowledge Eduardo Engel, Rafael Di Tella and Marco Bonomo contributions to this discussion. 
31 We are indebted to Ian Ayres and Ernesto Dal Bo for their contributions to this discussion.   23




  The  present  article  studies  the  interaction  between  public  and  private  financing  of  electoral 
campaigns and party ideology. The starting point was the basic modeling in Persson and Tabellini (2000), 
to which we added the hypothesis that parties have preferences regarding the political platforms they 
announce and that electoral campaigns may be financed by public funds as well as private contributions. 
  The model highlights two opposing movements in terms of equilibrium platforms. On one hand, 
there is a centripetal movement that makes parties tend to converge to the lobbyists’ preferred platform in 
order to get private financing. On the other hand, moving away from a party’s established ideological 
platform is costly, which results in a centrifugal movement when parties have opposing ideologies. This 
yields an intermediate movement where parties distinguish themselves by choosing different policies, 
typically distinct from the median voter’s preferred platform. It is noteworthy that public financing affects 
the likelihood that a party will win a majority of votes in the Legislature, but does not directly affect the 
equilibrium announced policies. 
  Since  parties  diverge  in  their  announced  policies,  private  contributions  will  be  positive  in 
equilibrium. Lobbyist groups will find it optimal to contribute to electoral campaigns, which mean a cost 
that, in the absence of ideology, these groups would not have to face. In equilibrium, ideological rigidities 
will be very important in determining how much private financing a party will receive from private lobby 
groups. In the limit, there could be a situation where a lobby decides to finance a party that has a very 
different ideological position but is more flexible in ideological terms. 
  Due to the divergence of the announced policies, the model suggests that poor and rich organized 
groups  tend  to  participate  more  in  the  electoral  process  and  give  away  higher  amounts  of  private 
contributions  than  the  middle  class.  This  result  could  explain  why  political  campaigns  seem  to  be 
relatively more expensive in a country like Brazil (with a more reduced middle class) than in a country 
like the US (with a more significant middle class), as argues Samuels (2003).  
  The model highlights two extreme effects of public financing on electoral competition. On the one 
hand,  public  financing  per  se  does  not  affect  how  political  parties  decide  which  platforms  they  will 
announce during the electoral campaign. This is a consequence of the fact that public contributions are 
given and fixed, and a party’s platform announcement if a strategic decision aimed at gaining direct 
voters or obtaining private contributions. On the other hand, public funds allow stronger parties to better 
influence voter, giving them a higher probability of obtaining a majority of votes.  In the long run, high 
amounts of public financing may lead to a limiting situation where one party becomes hegemonic in the   24
Legislature, which corresponds, in fact, to no party competition at all. This implies that there will be no 
expected change in the policy chosen by the hegemonic party, even though that policy may not maximize 
social welfare. This paper’s discussions are especially important in present day Latin America, where 
several countries are amending their electoral Legislation in order to improve their political institutions. 
The  main  policy  implication  of  the  study  is  that  governments  should  be  extremely  careful  in  their 
decisions to allocate high amounts of public funds to electoral campaigns. Furthermore, governments may 
find it useful to consider new forms of distribution of public funds that more closely approaches an equal-
share rule in order to reduce the large party advantage highlighted here.  
 
Appendix 
Proposition: Consider a proportional election, in which a party’s representation in the Legislature is given 
by the percentage of votes received by that party. Suppose party P, P=A, B, proposes policy gP and 
collects CP dollars in private and/or public funds. Then, the expected proportion of seats party A wins in 
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Proof:   For simplicity of notation we drop the time index.  
(i) Proportion of votes. Recall expression (4) for party A’s total number of votes: 
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(ii) Expected representation. Given expression (A.2) and the proportional electoral system, the expected 
representation of party A in the Legislature is:  k p b + = =
2
1
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(iii) Probability of getting the majority in the Legislature. Party A’s probability of getting the majority in 
the Legislature pA = prob [ 2 1 ³
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